Contextualizing the business responsibility to respect: How much is lost in translation? by Haines, Fiona et al.
	 	
	
 
 
 
This	is	the	authors’	final	peered	reviewed	(post	print)	
version	of	the	item	published	as:	
 
Haines,	Fiona,	Macdonald,	Kate	and	Balaton‐Chrimes,	Samantha	2011,	Contextualizing	the	
business	responsibility	to	respect:	How	much	is	lost	in	translation?,	in	The	UN	Guiding	Principles	
on	Business	and	Human	Rights:	Foundations	and	implementation,	Brill,	Leiden,	Netherlands,	
pp.107‐128.	
	
	
Available from Deakin Research Online: 
 
http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30059935	
	
	
	
	
Reproduced	with	the	kind	permission	of	the	copyright	owner.		
	
Copyright	:	2011,	Brill	
1 
 
Contextualising the business responsibility to respect: how much 
is lost in translation? 
 
Fiona Haines (University of Melbourne) 
Kate Macdonald (University of Melbourne) 
Samantha Balaton-Chrimes (University of Melbourne) 
 
 
Introduction 
As the work of the UN Special Representative (UNSR) for business and human rights moves 
towards its conclusion in mid-2011, the core principles of the UNSR’s ‘responsibility to 
respect’ framework have received widespread endorsement from businesses, NGOs and 
governments. The responsibility to respect framework is based on an account of ‘negative’ 
responsibility, namely the imperative that business should ‘at least do no harm’.1 There has 
been broad-based support for this proposition that business should respect (but not 
necessarily protect or promote) internationally recognised human rights. 
 
Negative responsibility is conceptualised as being universally applicable. The UNSR’s final 
report states clearly that “the responsibility to respect human rights applies fully and equally 
to all business enterprises”.2 But the report also acknowledges that the translation of these 
general principles into specific obligations governing business activity will need to differ 
according to context and that “[w]hen it comes to means for implementation ... one size does 
not fit all”.3 
 
However, close scrutiny needs to be paid to how this necessary flexibility is manifest both in 
code development and implementation. Clearly, there are benefits to a flexible approach. 
Flexibility can help ensure that demands placed on businesses are both reasonable and 
feasible given prevailing conditions. This in turn can strengthen both the legitimacy and 
enforceability of regulatory standards governing business activity. However, the practical 
task of translating general standards into varying local contexts is complex and contested, 
especially when dealing with business responsibilities for indirect forms of harm. As we have 
                                                 
1 Deployment of such a positive/negative distinctionby the UN Special Representative’s ‘responsibility to 
respect’ framework is explicit in Human Rights Council, "Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, 
Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development; Protect, Respect and 
Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights," in Report of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 
John Ruggie (Human Rights Council, 2008)., p.9: “To respect rights essentially means not to infringe on the 
rights of others – put simply, to do no harm”. 
2———, "Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie: Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework,"(United Nations 
Human Rights Council, 2011)., p.21  
3Ibid., p.5 
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discussed in more detail elsewhere,4 human rights abuses often results from business 
interaction with other actors and institutions in their external environment. Varying 
contextual environments therefore have an important bearing on defining the specific 
obligations required of businesses to avoid indirect harm. Further there is significant room for 
disagreement regarding what business obligations are both reasonable and feasible to demand 
in any particular locale. In diverse arenas, and under conditions of uncertainty and political 
contestation, there is a risk that flexibility can result in a ‘watering down’ of general 
principles to the lowest common denominator.  
 
The reasons why overarching regulatory principles can get ‘lost in translation’ when applied 
in practice have important implications for understanding how the UNSR’s responsibility to 
respect framework can be meaningfully implemented across widely varying regulatory 
contexts. The central goal of this chapter is to understand why and under what conditions this 
loss is likely to arise, and how regulatory standards for business and human rights might be 
designed to enable the responsibility to respect principle to be applied in context-sensitive 
ways, without losing regulatory force. 
 
Our empirical analysis draws its insights from multiple, intersecting academic literatures. In 
section I below we tease out the various contributions of the political science,5 regulatory6 
and aspects of the postcolonial7 literatures that can provide a nuanced appreciation of context, 
and through which the moral and practical ambiguities underlying the demand for sensitivity 
to context are drawn out. Caution is required, however, since whilst these literatures can 
communicate with one another, they also inhabit separate spheres so that terms and 
conversations within each sphere may appear similar, but can also carry specific meanings 
that are not easily translated between settings.8 
                                                 
4Samantha Balaton-Chrimes, Fiona Haines, and Kate Macdonald, "Holding the Invisible Hand to Account? 
Beyond Individual Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights " in Australian Political Science Association 
(Melbourne: 2010), Kate Macdonald, "Re-Thinking “Spheres of Responsibility”: Business, Human Rights and 
Institutional Action," Journal of Business Ethics 99, no. 4 (2011). 
5Philip Alston, ed., Non State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), Stephen 
Kobrin, "Private Political Authority and Public Responsibility: Transnational Politics, Transnational Firms, and 
Human Rights " Business Ethics Quarterly 19, no. 3 (2009). 
6 See e.g. Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998), Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
Deregulation Debate (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: 
Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Neil Gunningham 
and Richard Johnstone, Regulating Workplace Safety: System and Sanctions (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1999). 
7Antony Anghie, "The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities," Third World 
Quarterly 27, no. 5 (2006), ———, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law / Antony 
Anghie, Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law: 37 (Cambridge, UK ; New York : 
Cambridge University Press, c2004., 2004). 
8 A specific example is the use of the term ‘continuous improvement’ in the regulatory literature (see for 
example Gunningham and Johnstone, Regulating Workplace Safety: System and Sanctions. pp 41-4) which 
requires companies to improve specific standards over time as technology and work processes develop. This is 
quite different from the term ‘progressive realisation’, which is used in international law and human rights 
literatures to refer to the process where a business is understood as non-compliant with a particular standard but 
with an understanding that it will reach the required standard over time. Yet, these terms are sometimes used 
interchangeably.  
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Translation of business responsibilities from principle to practice involves at least two steps. 
The first step is from internationally recognised human rights to guidelines or standards 
detailing corresponding business responsibilities. The second is the translation of the 
principles as found in the guidelines into everyday practice. The UNSR’s framework account 
of a business responsibility to respect all internationally recognised human rights involves the 
first kind of translation from rights to responsibilities.9 Likewise, private regulatory standards 
for business and human rights involve translation of this kind. Although most private 
regulatory codes do not address the full range of internationally recognised human rights, 
their goal is to translate those rights they do target into regulatory standards that codify 
corresponding business obligations. The UNSR’s final report explicitly recognises the 
important ways in which principles of business responsibility are institutionalised through a 
diverse range of private regulatory codes aimed at improving business practice: 
“commitments undertaken by industry bodies, multi-stakeholder and other collaborative 
initiatives, through codes of conduct, performance standards, global framework agreements 
between trade unions and transnational corporations, and similar undertakings”.10 These 
codes address a wide range of issues, including labour rights standards, occupational health 
and safety (OHS), social services and infrastructure, environmental protection, cultural and 
indigenous rights and ‘fair’ terms of market exchange. Once business responsibilities have 
been codified at the level of general guidelines and/or more specific regulatory standards, 
these duties then need a further phase of translation, in order to shape everyday decision-
making and local practices of transnational businesses. This is the second step in the 
translation of principle into practice. 
 
Our empirical analysis is based on data relating to both these steps: the content, and the 
implementation of existing private regulatory systems that govern the impact of transnational 
business enterprises on social and labour dimensions of human rights. The widespread and 
established nature of these systems makes them suitable objects of investigation for exploring 
how general principles regarding a business responsibility to respect are being translated into 
varying local contexts. 
 
To analyse code content, we conducted a detailed coding analysis of 33 existing private 
standards systems relating specifically to business responsibilities for social and labour 
aspects of human rights (see Appendix 1). We focused on standards centred on human rights 
which had a significant international profile and market penetration.11 We excluded standards 
                                                 
9The difficulties involved in this translation from rights to responsibilities are discussed by several other 
chapters in this volume. 
10Human Rights Council, "Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the Issue of Human 
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie: Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework.", 
p.26 
11 In selecting regulatory codes to analyse, we have aimed to analyse the whole relevant ‘population’, as we 
conceptualise it, though given the plurality and heterogeneity of these standards, it is difficult to draw clear 
conceptual or empirical boundaries around our ‘population’. To help resolve conceptual ambiguities about how 
to define human rights standards in the context of MNCs, we conceptualised our population as including any 
standards that addressed three or more categories of internationally recognised human rights. To address the 
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that specialised in only one area of regulation (e.g. OHS or unions), or that operated only at 
the level of single companies. 
 
Analysis of the codes was complemented by research into their interpretation and 
implementation on the ground in the tea sector in India. This enabled us to examine whether 
the provision of context-sensitive flexibilities within regulatory codes operated to strengthen 
the contribution of regulatory codes to human rights compliance, or allowed businesses to 
water down or avoid their responsibilities. To examine implementation, we undertook field 
based research on two major regulatory standard systems, identified as among the most 
extensively developed with regard to context-sensitive provisions: Fairtrade Labelling 
Organisation (FLO) and Rainforest Alliance.  
 
As we explain, the extent to which context-sensitive flexibilities within regulatory codes 
operated to strengthen or dilute their effectiveness in enhancing human rights realisation 
depended both on the way flexibilities were formulated in code content (explored in section 
II), and dynamics of code interpretation and implementation (section III).  
 
I. Context-sensitive standards and the elusive art of translation: 
exploring the relevant debates 
 
Debates about the merits of applying general norms to diverse social and institutional 
contexts are familiar to both regulatory and human rights scholars. Further, the substance of 
their respective debates lies along similar continua with those arguing for universal norms (or 
regulatory goals) at one end and those arguing for different norms or regulatory goals to 
apply in different contexts at the other. Between these two poles lie arguments from those 
who promote flexibility in the means utilised to achieve regulatory goals or requisite 
standards, but view the required standards themselves as non-negotiable – at least in the 
medium to long term.12 Yet, universal application of norms – albeit with flexible means – 
raises concerns about ‘imperialism’, and fears that contemporary dynamics of ‘soft’ legal 
transplant may be yet another expression of colonial power relations. 
 
Political demands from activists and some (often western) governments for a non-negotiable 
set of human rights norms that apply to business comprise a significant element of this 
literature.13 Despite this demand, there remains significant uncertainty about what strategies 
would enable human rights principles to respond sensitively to varying contexts. Further, 
                                                                                                                                                        
lack of consistent information from private standards organisations about numbers of accredited firms, we drew 
on other academic and grey literature, as well as discussions with staff from some private standards 
organisations and other experts in the field to identify the most influential and widely adopted standards.  
12Gunningham and Johnstone, Regulating Workplace Safety: System and Sanctions, Ayres and Braithwaite, 
Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate, John Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism: How 
It Works, Ideas for Making It Work Better (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008), M.K. Sparrow, The Regulatory 
Craft: Controlling Risks, Solving Problems and Managing Compliance (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2000). 
13 For an overview see Peter Utting, "Rethinking Business Regulation: From Self-Regulation to Social Control," 
in UNRISD Technology Business and Society Programme Paper Number 15 (Geneva: UNRISD, 2005). 
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when indirect harms flowing from business practice are taken into account, sensitivity to 
context is critical in understanding the specific ways business interacts with the community, 
shapes community development and affects economic sustainability.14 Yet there is currently 
little detailed understanding of how varying social and institutional contexts affect the 
capacities of different actors to discharge responsibilities for human rights. 
 
The regulatory literature contains analogous debates (and uncertainties). For a substantial 
portion of this literature, the regulatory goals in question are assumed to be both necessary 
and non-negotiable. Safe workplaces or an unpolluted environment, for example, are 
understood as fundamental indicators of effective regulatory regimes. Debate is centred 
instead on the most effective means for achieving compliance, and how the context and the 
character of the particular regulated enterprise itself (e.g. its size, the orientation of its 
organisational ‘culture,’ position in the contracting hierarchy and so on) affect compliance 
capacity. Views differ regarding the value (or otherwise) of prescriptive rules,15 process 
standards16 or various iterations of enforced self regulation or ‘meta’ regulation.17 The 
comparative regulatory literature takes this a step further to explore the way regulatory 
strategies in one economic, political and cultural context may be inappropriate and ineffective 
in another.18 Direct imposition of a particular regulatory approach from an alien economic 
and political context has been argued to act as a legal “irritant” contributing to ongoing 
entrenchment of disadvantage.19 
 
The international reach of private regulatory codes and their cross-national enforceability also 
resonates with elements within the postcolonial literature. For some, international laws, 
regulations, codes and standards are argued to continue the colonial ‘civilising mission’.20 
This perspective can alert us to the moral complexities surrounding private regulation. It 
cautions actors (particularly liberal activists from the west and north) to be wary of advancing 
another form of colonial imperialism, albeit this time through promotion of a (private) 
regulatory regime aimed at protecting human rights. This is difficult territory since such 
moral sensibility sits uncomfortably with demands for the realisation of absolute standards. 
Further, engendering what might be termed ‘postcolonial guilt’ in fair-trade regimes also may 
                                                 
14Balaton-Chrimes, Haines, and Macdonald, "Holding the Invisible Hand to Account? Beyond Individual 
Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights ", Macdonald, "Re-Thinking “Spheres of Responsibility”: Business, 
Human Rights and Institutional Action." 
15 For a discussion see Julia Black, Rules and Regulators (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). 
16C Coglianese and D.Lazer, "Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve 
Public Goals," Law and Society Review 37, no. 4 (2003), Gunningham and Johnstone, Regulating Workplace 
Safety: System and Sanctions. 
17Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate, C. Parker, The Open 
Corporation: Effective Self Regulation and Democracy (Cambridge: CUP, 2002). 
18 See generally the essays in David Nelken and Johannes Feest, Adapting Legal Cultures / Edited by David 
Nelken and Johannes Feest, Oñati International Series in Law and Society (Oxford : Hart, 2001., 2001). 
19 See Gunther Teubner, "Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends up in New 
Divergences," The Modern Law Review 61, no. 1 (1998). 
20Anghie, "The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities.", ———, Imperialism, 
Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law / Antony Anghie. See also Fiona Haines, Globalization and 
Regulatory Character: Regulatory Reform after the Kader Toy Factory Fire ed. David Nelken, Advances in 
Criminology (Dartmouth: Ashgate, 2005). 
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provide leverage for local actors to invoke existing economic and other constraints21 to push 
for retention of an (oppressive) status quo.  
 
Each of these literatures draws attention to the importance of human rights (or regulatory 
aims) in general terms, but suggests very real challenges to meaningful and practical 
translation of the general to specific goals on the ground. The political science literature 
highlights the political and social contestation surrounding the translation; the post-colonial 
literature highlights the moral complexity; while the regulatory literature engages with the 
practical challenges confronting goals of effective enforcement. Together, these literatures 
prompt us to evaluate how principles can be  
both accepted as legitimate and result in improved human rights outcomes. 
 
Contextualism within the UNSR’s responsibility to respect framework 
 
The UNSR’s framework is clear about the universal applicability of core regulatory goals, 
stating that “all business enterprises have the same responsibility to respect human rights 
wherever they operate”.22 However, the need to adjust interpretations of business 
responsibility to local contexts is also explicitly recognised at various points throughout the 
UNSR’s final report.23 The report suggests that the means through which a business 
enterprise meets its responsibility to respect human rights” will vary depending on both 
internal characteristics of different business enterprises, and features of the external context. 
 
With regard to internal firm characteristics, the size of a given firm as well as the extent to 
which it operates individually or as part of a corporate group are identified as relevant 
variables. Discussion of external context, too, contains some specificity. There are various 
references to the need for any given business to take into account “the nature and context of 
its operations”,24 variations in “operational context”, and variations across economic sectors 
in considering what specific practices the responsibility to respect principle demands.25 
Moreover, the UNSR has stated clearly that “business enterprises may be involved with 
adverse human rights impacts” not only as a result of their own activities, but also “as a result 
of their business relationships with other parties”,26 so that the business responsibility to 
respect extends to cases in which businesses “contribute to abuse through the relationships 
connected to their activities, such as with business partners, suppliers, state agencies and 
                                                 
21Constraints that clearly may be shaped by the demands made by global business networks. 
22Human Rights Council, "Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the Issue of Human 
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie: Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework.", 
p.21 
23 For example: “the Guiding Principles are not intended as a tool kit, simply to be taken off the shelf and 
plugged in. While the Principles themselves are universally applicable, the means by which they are realised 
will reflect the fact that we live in a world of 192 United Nations Member States, 80,000 transnational 
enterprises, 10 times as many subsidiaries and countless millions of national firms”. See Ibid., p. 5 
24Ibid., p. 16 
25Ibid., p.14 
26Ibid., p.14 
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other non state actors”.27 The report goes further here to discuss the degree of leverage that 
businesses can exercise over other actors in their external environment.28 
 
In places, the UNSR’s final report goes further still, detailing examples of what businesses 
should (and should not) do to be compliant with the responsibility to respect principle. In 
relation to interactions with governments, for example, it is stated that “Business enterprises 
should not undermine States’ abilities to meet their own human rights obligations, including 
by actions that might weaken the integrity of judicial processes”.29 More broadly, it is 
suggested that “Leverage may be increased by, for example, offering capacity building or 
other incentives to the related entity, or collaborating with other actors”.30 
 
Nonetheless, there remains significant room for interpretation of how companies are obliged 
to behave. There is no doubt that the UNSR takes the need for context-sensitivity seriously, 
but what this means in practice remains ambiguous. While a range of useful illustrative 
examples of contextual variation are offered, clear principles or procedural guidelines for 
determining how responsibilities should be adapted to contexts in which businesses confront 
varying capacities and constraints remain elusive.31 
 
II. Code content – translating principles into rules 
 
In light of such ambiguity, how, then, are business obligations for human rights currently 
being codified? Our analysis of private regulatory codes can help us understand how 
adaptation of general principles to varying contexts is currently being approached, and 
whether such ambiguity has demonstrable consequences in terms of either strengthening or 
weakening regulatory outcomes. In the analysis below, we identify the most common 
methods whereby regulatory standards are made sensitive to context. The most important of 
these is some form of progressive realisation provision within a particular code. In some 
                                                 
27———, "Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, Including the Right to Development; Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and 
Human Rights.". The UNSR’s final report gives further clues regarding which external actors businesses have 
responsibilities towards, with particular emphasis placed on business partners. Explanatory notes to page 14 
indicate that “For the purpose of these Guiding Principles a business enterprise’s ... ‘business relationships’ are 
understood to includerelationships with business partners, entities in its value chain, and any other non-State or 
State entity directly linked to its business operations, products or services.” 
28 Among the factors that will enter into the determination of the appropriate action in such situations are the 
enterprise’s leverage over the entity concerned, how crucial the relationship is to the enterprise, the severity of 
the abuse, and whether terminating the relationship with the entity itself would have adverse human rights 
consequences. ———, "Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the Issue of Human 
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie: Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework.", 
p.19. 
29Ibid., p.13 
30Ibid., p. 18 
31The final report is not completely silent in relation to procedural approaches to resolving ambiguities around 
contextual operationalisation. Repeatedly throughout the report there is reference to the need to draw on 
consultation and expertise to resolve such matters, for example: “In assessing how best to respond, [businesses] 
will often be well advised to draw on not only expertise and cross-functional consultation within the enterprise, 
but also to consult externally with credible, independent experts, including from governments, civil society, 
national human rights institutions and relevant multi-stakeholder initiatives” (Ibid., p.21)  
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cases progressive realisation is codified directly, via acknowledgement that demanding 
immediate fulfilment of regulatory goals is not feasible and/or reasonable, together with 
specification of some means of indicating what progress towards regulatory goals is expected 
over a given timeframe. In other cases, the principle of progressive realisation is codified by 
spelling out specific obligations businesses should undertake in the presence of barriers to 
full compliance.  
 
Direct codification of progressive realisation 
 
Direct codification of the principle of progressive realisation is a common means through 
which existing private regulatory standards try to deal with the mediating influence of social 
conditions and constraints across varying local contexts. Progressive realisation provisions 
explicitly recognise that there may be constraints internal and/or external to the firm that 
prevent full and immediate compliance. Firms may find that their efforts to avoid 
participation in harmful social practices are undermined by regulatory, market or wider social 
constraints. Such constraints might result from government policy, such as constraints on 
union rights and freedoms; from market competition; or from pervasive social norms, such as 
entrenched patterns of employment discrimination against minority groups.  
 
Progressive realisation provisions provide flexibilities to enable compliance over time, whilst 
seeking to define the reasonable limits of business responsibility for ongoing processes of 
change.32 For example, private standard-setting schemes such as FLO or Rainforest Alliance 
have developed separate minimum and ‘progress’ standards, laying out defined timelines 
over which processes of capacity building and organisational change can be undertaken to 
help overcome both internal and external constraints. 
 
Provisions of this kind were quite widespread in our data, though by no means standard 
practice. 18 of the 38 codes we analysed included provisions for progressive realisation in 
some form, though the principle was implemented in quite different ways. Fixed timeframes 
could be specified, such as with FLO where six year audit cycles demanded compliance with 
increasing numbers of standards. In some cases, such as Rainforest Alliance, a cumulative or 
points system operated allowing companies to fall short on some standards that they found 
particularly difficult, so long as they compensated in other areas. 
 
These progressive realisation provisions can operate either to extend or delimit business 
responsibility. On the one hand they can let business ‘off the hook,’ enabling businesses to 
repeatedly refuse to address the hardest categories of issues, such as union capacity and 
freedom in highly politicised environments. On the other hand, some progressive realisation 
provisions made it clear that constraints were no excuse for non-compliance in the longer 
term; those standards demanding full compliance with all provisions required over a fixed 
and auditable timeframe would fall into this category. In this latter case, however, at the end 
                                                 
32Richard Locke, Fei Qin, and Alberto Brause, "Does Monitoring Improve Labor Standards?: Lessons from 
Nike" MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 4612-06(2006). 
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of this specified timeframe the progressive realisation provisions effectively come to an end, 
leaving the standards open to the charge of contextual insensitivity over the medium term.  
 
Despite these sometimes extensive provisions for progressive realisation, the practical 
demands they impose on business remain ambiguous. In particular, they are weakened by the 
absence of clear statements of principle about the kinds of costs and risks businesses can 
reasonably be asked to incur in contributing to progressive realisation of challenging 
principles, how costs and risks vary depending on the different capacities of different firms, 
and over what timeframes it is therefore reasonable to expect fulfilment of human rights 
outcomes of different kinds to be achieved. Further, statements about what processes 
businesses should put in place to resolve these questions lacked clarity. 
 
Codifying specific obligations designed to build capacity for compliance 
 
Most existing codes recognise the risk that businesses may invoke progressive realisation 
provisions continually thereby failing to build their capacity for full compliance in the longer 
term. To address this risk, codes can require some form of internal system be put in place to 
manage progression to full compliance. For example, the ISO26000 draft standards require 
businesses to “develop a plan for addressing some social responsibility issues in the short 
term and some over a longer period of time. Such a plan should be realistic and should take 
into account the capabilities of the organization, the resources available and the priority of the 
issues”. The particular content of these kinds of provisions varies depending on the outcomes 
being pursued, and the nature of the constraints that are expected to be confronted. 
 
Internal management systems also were commonly required to build capacity in avoiding 
business contribution to human rights harm. 33 out of 38 standards have process standard 
requirements of some kind. 13 codes specifically require that businesses carry out formal 
human rights risk assessments. For example, such requirements exist within the IFC 
Performance Standards, the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) and the 
Global Compact. 
 
In other cases, standards specified directly how businesses should conduct their relationships 
(especially with sub-contractors in supply chains). The most common example here was 
standards requiring businesses to carry out due diligence to identify important sources of 
indirect harm arising from their supply chain or other business partnerships. 24 of the 38 
standards we analysed included requirements for due diligence of this kind. However, 
emphasis remained on obligations to identify risks, with little articulation of actions required 
to confront risks. 
 
The nature of the relationship between businesses and governments was also addressed by 
some codes. While such provisions were less common, 8 of the 38 codes included standards 
relating to payment of taxes, lobbying, avoidance of bribery and corruption, and so on. The 
Global Compact cites ‘contribution to the public debate’ as one of the ways in which 
companies can support and respect human rights. Similarly, the OECD Guidelines on MNEs 
10 
 
emphasise the importance of government policy frameworks in supporting human rights 
compliance, and acknowledge that businesses should not undermine institutional and policy 
conditions favourable to human rights compliance. For example, its principles suggest that 
companies should “Refrain from seeking or accepting exemptions not contemplated in the 
statutory or regulatory framework related to environmental, health, safety, labour, taxation, 
financial incentives, or other issues” (Principle 5); “Contribute to the development of 
environmentally meaningful and economically efficient public policy, for example, by means 
of partnerships or initiatives that will enhance environmental awareness and protection” 
(Principle 8); and “Abstain from any improper involvement in local political activities” 
(Principle 11). 
 
Similarly, the Global Reporting Initiative aims to “focus attention on the impacts 
organizations have on the communities in which they operate, and disclos[e] how the risks 
that may arise from interactions with other social institutions are managed and mediated ... In 
particular, information is sought on the risks associated with bribery and corruption [and] 
undue influence in public policy-making.” In a small number of private codes businesses 
have also committed to transparent disclosure of lobbying positions or receipt of government 
assistance as part of their corporate social responsibility programs.33  
 
Broader, almost quasi-governmental responsibilities were specified in a number of codes that 
encapsulated the ethic of progressive realisation. For example, 26 out of the 38 standards 
specified that business should contribute in varying ways to social services and infrastructure 
within their local communities. These typically involved obligations to provide or facilitate 
housing, educational or health facilities, or to maintain these to a certain level. 
Responsibilities to facilitate or provide employment opportunities for wider community 
members were also present. However, in the context of high levels of poverty, poor 
educational and health provision, and so on, most standards did not require that businesses 
provide social services and infrastructure at a level that might be considered fully compliant 
with social and economic rights. Rather, the principle governing these obligations was for 
business to make some ongoing contribution to maintaining these conditions, but within the 
constraints of local context. In other words, these business obligations seem (implicitly) to be 
interpreted as contributing to longer term processes of progressive rights realisation.  
 
These provisions can strengthen the contribution of regulatory codes to human rights 
realisation in so far as they require business to take on some responsibility for broader social 
problems. But they can also weaken regulatory effectiveness if their demands on business 
overstretch what companies are sustainably capable of delivering, and/or ask business to take 
on roles that are not appropriate to their particular status as business-oriented organs of 
society.34 Excessive obligations regarding provision of social infrastructure around farms 
                                                 
33 It should however be noted that there remains an important qualitative distinction between disclosure and 
guarantee of sound practices. 
34 The UNSR’s final report emphasises that the framework is grounded on an affirmation of the view of business 
enterprises as “specialised organs of society performing specialised functions”. See Human Rights Council, 
"Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
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could contribute to hollowing out state provision – reinforcing problematic forms of 
dependency and reproducing paternalistic relationships between farm owners and agricultural 
workers. Further, strategies of defiance or creative compliance can develop around regulatory 
demands considered illegitimate. Yet, if the standards are not sufficiently demanding, they 
risk a ritualistic approach to progressive realisation where existing practice that falls well 
below regulatory goals is legitimised instead.  
 
The principle of progressive realisation remains important as a means of adapting business 
responsibilities to varying contexts, and thereby helping to minimise problems of empty 
symbolism and ritualism when standards are infeasible, or problems of perceived illegitimacy 
when standards are perceived to be unreasonably demanding. Yet, within the codes there 
remains a striking absence of a clear principled account of how to assess reasonable burdens 
and timeframes appropriate to particular capacities and constraints. Without this specificity, 
internal management systems and due diligence procedures can fail to build sufficient 
capacity to engender full compliance. The codes, important as they are, leave the possibility 
for little meaningful change to occur on the ground.  
 
III. The interpretation and implementation of codes – translating rules 
into behaviour 
 
In the presence of persistent ambiguities both within the UNSR’s responsibility to respect 
framework, and existing private regulatory codes for business and human rights, how then are 
these standards being implemented on the ground within regulated sectors? Based on our 
analysis of code interpretation and implementation in the Indian tea sector, we analyse both 
how context-responsive provisions are working to strengthen the purposes of the regulatory 
schemes (that is, to help ensure appropriate business contributions to the protection of human 
rights), and are being used to water down the business contribution to human rights 
realisation. Overall, these ambiguities within codes were resolved in very ad hoc ways. 
Whether the inclusion of contextual flexibilities strengthened or weakened standards 
depended on the informal dynamics of negotiation between standard setting organisations, 
auditors and producers at the local level regarding appropriate standard interpretation and 
implementation. 
 
Our analysis focused on two schemes, FLO and Rainforest Alliance. FLO operates across 
multiple sectors (mainly but not exclusively agriculture), and authors and manages several 
different sets of standards that focus on a range of commodities, and are adapted for different 
production arrangements: small producers, hired labour and contract labour. Our analysis 
focuses on the hired labour standards that apply to tea plantations in India.35 FLO certified 
businesses are audited by FLO-CERT, an independent auditing body. Like FLO, Rainforest 
                                                                                                                                                        
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie: Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework.", p.6. 
35Tea in India is also produced, to a lesser extent, on small farms, however very few of these are organised into 
cooperatives, and there is only one cooperative certified to the FLO Small Producers Organisation (Tea) 
standard.  
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Alliance authors and manages standards which are applied in a number of agricultural sectors 
across many different countries. Rainforest Alliance only works with one standard – the 
Sustainable Agriculture Network standard (SAN) – though this encompasses several 
addendums and interpretation guidelines adapted to different commodities and production 
countries. We focus on the generic SAN standard as it applies to the Indian tea sector.36 
 
Both FLO and Rainforest Alliance have fairly extensive provisions addressing how to adapt 
business obligations to varying regulatory contexts. Both include extensive provisions for 
progressive realisation; require businesses to contribute in some way to ensuring worker 
access to adequate forms of social services and infrastructure where government provision is 
not forthcoming; and incorporate modest obligations for remediation when business 
obligations have not been met. For example, Rainforest Alliance standards require buyers to 
provide some training and technical assistance to producers lacking capacity. FLO also offers 
some programs to assist producers with compliance in cases of demonstrated need.  
 
The tea sector in India was an appropriate case study for a number of reasons. Despite the 
presence of law and regulation to curb abuse of human rights, tea workers in India have 
suffered considerably from the establishment of the first plantations by the British in the 
colonial era to the present. The Plantation Labour Act 1949 stipulates a range of social 
services that must be suppliedby plantations for workers, such as housing, education and 
medical care. Yet the standard of these services usually remains low.37 Legislative provisions 
at the state level prescribe a minimum wage for workers; nevertheless, the plantation worker 
minimum wage is lower than the minimum wage for non-plantation workers. Further, 
minimum wages on plantations vary between states: wages in the North-East Indian states of 
Assam and West Bengal are half the level of those in South Indian states of Kerala and Tamil 
Nadu. The dramatic fall in the price of tea in the early 2000s has increased the economic 
pressure on plantations and small farmers, increasing hardship for workers. Recent crises 
such as this compound society-wide challenges of a caste system and the historically 
embedded ‘social system’ of plantations.38 
 
Our field research was based in Tamil Nadu, and to a lesser extent Kerala, with some 
business and NGO interviews in Chennai, Bangalore and Kolkata. Overall, we interviewed 
92 individuals from 51 organisations across the Indian tea sector. These included interviews 
with estate workers, smallholders, representatives of unions and other activist organisations, 
                                                 
36At the time of research, Rainforest Alliance was in the process of developing interpretation guidelines for tea 
in India, in consultation with businesses and environmental NGOs in the country. 
37Anna Morser, "A Bitter Cup: The Exploitation of Tea Workers in India and Kenya Supplying British 
Supermarkets,"(London: War on Want, 2010), Susan Van der wal, "Sustainability Issues in the Tea Sector: A 
Comparative Analysis of Six Leading Producing Countries,"(Amsterdam: SOMO, 2008), Samantha Goddard, 
"Tea Break: Crisis Brewing in India,"(London: ActionAid UK, 2005), J Neilson and B. Pritchard, Value Chain 
Struggles: Institutions and Governance in the Plantation Districts of South India (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008). 
38
Sharit Kumar Bhowmik, "The Plantation as a Social System," Economic and Political Weekly 15 (1980). 
Neilson and Pritchard, Value Chain Struggles: Institutions and Governance in the Plantation Districts of South 
India. 
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lawyers, estate managers, trading companies, government regulators, industry bodies, 
auditors, and representatives of standard setting schemes. 
 
In the analysis below, we focus on implementation of provisions for progressive realisation of 
standards, as the most important form in which private standards facilitate responsiveness of 
obligations to regulatory context. In the tea sector in India, progressive realisation provisions 
apply within both the Rainforest Alliance and FLO standards. Several such regulatory 
standards were singled out by tea producers we spoke with as being particularly problematic. 
These were standards governing: minimum or living wages; provision of social infrastructure 
for plantation workers; and environmental protection of certain kinds. We documented 
widespread resistance among producers to acceptance of and compliance with these 
standards. Because these resistance strategies we observed are of potentially broad relevance 
it is useful to outline them in some detail.  
 
Elements of resistance strategies 
 
Resistance strategies were built on several inter-related (somewhat inconsistent) claims made 
by local businesses. First, interviewees would conspicuously affirm businesses’ commitment 
to the general regulatory principles founded on a universal commitment to realising human 
rights. At the same time, businesses would then question the specific regulatory standards 
through which these recognised rights were being translated into auditable obligations.  
 
The discrediting of standards occurred in two somewhat contradictory ways. First, some 
businesses claimed that local regulations made these international demands redundant, 
arguing that existing state and local regulatory obligations imposed were sufficiently 
effective in protecting universal human rights-based standards. Producers argued that the 
general principles of rights protection codified within private regulatory standards were 
already being implemented by virtue of local regulatory systems. Most producers affirmed 
the strength of existing national regulations and their equal or in some cases superior rigour 
to that of international standards. For example, the President of the Tamil Nadu Planters 
Association asserted that: 
 
“The enforcement of the [Plantations] Act is very foolproof – everything is there – 
everything is being implemented by the Inspector of Plantations. They are empowered 
with all necessary powers to prosecute management, even to criminally prosecute 
management. ... The following of Acts is compulsory – it doesn’t matter if it is 
difficult, you have no answer to that – just because you are finding it difficult doesn’t 
mean it can be ignored – you have to follow the Act and follow the Legislation.”  
 
At the same time, though, it was argued that specific FLO or Rainforest Alliance standards 
were unrealistic and/or inappropriate to the local context. External constraints were 
commonly invoked to show the infeasibility of implementing these standards. Despite putting 
a strong case for the redundancy of international regulatory codes early in his interview, for 
example, the President of the Planters’ Association later argued: “certain provisions are 
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impractical, creating problems for citizens, even law abiding citizens”. Both government and 
international standards were open to challenge. The president continued “Whenever any 
difficulties are faced by management or employers in implementing certain provisions we 
will take up the case with government, saying that we can’t implement it, and that we are 
facing difficulties.” 
 
Wage levels were a particular issue here. On this important and politically charged issue, 
resistance involved two distinct elements. First, the distinction between legal minimum 
wages and ‘living wages’ – the latter concept being given formal expression in regulatory 
standards such as those of FLO – was not acknowledged by local actors. Within local debates 
about wages, discussion shifted immediately from living wages to the Indian state and the 
local politics of setting minimum wages. Discussion of what is or should comprise a living 
wage in the Indian context was conspicuous by its absence. 
 
With the focus of debate thus narrowed, arguments about the infeasibility of increasing legal 
minimum wages within the local context were invoked. Government-defined minimum wage 
setting has been deeply politicised in the Indian tea sector. The local trade publication the 
Planters’ Chronicle documents the extensive debate concerning wages. While on the one 
hand businesses publicly affirm the general principle of protecting minimum wages, there is 
significant debate regarding how this principle should be interpreted and implemented. One 
article in the Planters’ Chronicle, entitled “Minimum Wages: Who protects the employer?”, 
claims that the “plantation industry is strangulated by the promulgation of a politically 
engineered minimum wage without taking into consideration the capacity of the plantation 
sector to pay it”, going on to argue that the definition of minimum wages must consider 
prevailing market conditions. 
 
Specific environmental standards—specifically buffer zones around plantations – were also 
targets for criticism. The claim that “the aim of this [environmental requirement] is to make 
production unsustainable; to make business unsustainable” was expressed at a Rainforest 
Alliance local stakeholder forum that included 20 or so tea plantation managers held in Ooty 
(a major tea growing district of Tamil Nadu). Again, the importance of local standards was 
emphasised. 
 
“The purpose of the standard is to come up with local standards relevant to how we do 
things here – to develop local indicators. These are global standards and they are not 
taking that into account”.  
 
Various elements at play here comprised a strategy that might be considered a ‘judo move’, 
which can wrestle realisation of human rights to the ground. First, criticism was pre-empted 
through claims that rights were already being realised through the application of local law. 
Secondly, the superiority of local law as a means of regulating local practice was bolstered by 
de-legitimating ‘foreign’ or ‘international’ demands as (a) insensitive and (b) likely to result 
in pushing business to the brink of insolvency under prevailing economic conditions. The 
claims of redundancy on the one hand, and contextual inappropriateness on the other, sit in 
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some tension with one another. However, they share in common assumptions about the 
superior legitimacy and authority of locally authored regulatory standards. Both claims 
assume that locally authored standards are able to respond to context more effectively than 
international standards, since they can better understand and accommodate contextual 
capacities and constraints. This ‘judo move’was facilitated by a postcolonial sensibility in 
which ‘outsiders’ are reluctant to challenge established local practice.  
 
The ‘judo move’ in action 
 
Debate around standards regulating business contributions to the provision of social 
infrastructure illustrate how this resistance strategy was deployed. Relatively minor issues 
were invoked as a means of questioning the authority and overall credibility of the standards’ 
authorship and local relevance. For example, at the Rainforest Alliance event we attended in 
Ooty, one plantation manager commented that the national standards in the Plantation Labour 
Act (PLA) were generally higher than the Rainforest Alliance standards in regard to 
provision of housing, but that the Rainforest Alliance standards included reference to the 
provision of heating, furniture and so on for plantation labourers – provisions that are not in 
the PLA. One planter read out from the standard a provision demanding heating for cold 
climates, and everyone laughed. Much laughter was also generated by the issue of the 
requirement for sufficient supplies of toilet paper, leading to a relatively uncontested 
conclusion that this provision should be removed, since it was irrelevant in the local context. 
This discussion set a tone whereby the difficulty of adapting general standards to local 
contexts was generally acknowledged within the room, putting the international standard 
setters – who were all too aware of their own deficiencies in understanding local context (and 
yet clearly committed to the principle of responding to it) – on the back foot.  
 
Yet, discussion then moved quickly onto more controversial issues, such as OHS regulations 
prohibiting women from applying chemicals. Several plantation managers at the forum stated 
that local practices allowed all workers to apply chemicals at certain times. Further, the 
viability of local production practices, where women dominate the labour force, required that 
this be permitted to continue. Someone asked: “what if there are no other labourers to do it – 
what do you do, close down the plantation?” The Rainforest Alliance representative stayed 
firm on this point arguing “It is difficult for us to dilute the standards on these things” but 
affirmed that individual farms could choose not to comply on this issue and simply receive 
fewer points on the scheme’s progressive compliance metric. The representative continued 
“[so]you can take the non-conformity, though I know that’s not a satisfying solution.”  
 
Invoking the existence of context-specific constraints in these ways operated as a further 
means of resisting the implementation of international standards. Contested interpretations of 
the balance between business capacity to make changes on the one hand, and external 
constraints that they can’t control on the other, played a central role in determining how these 
dynamics were resolved. Universal principles sitting behind the standards were not 
questioned (or glossed over in the case of living wages), yet the demands for sensitivity to 
local context in interpreting general principles upset automatic translation of general 
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principles into specific obligations on business, creating spaces within which implementation 
could be resisted.  
 
In other cases, reference to the ‘imperialist’ nature of the codes’ international authorship was 
even more explicit. For example, in an article in the Planters’ Chronicle, an article on 
international certifying agencies (such as Fairtrade and Rainforest Alliance) asserted:  
 
“The certifying agencies as such are institutions that are capitalising on the poverty of 
the farmers and the guilt of conspicuous consumption of the highly affluent in the 
western world... As far as India is concerned it has much better labour protective 
legislation than the US, China and many of the European Countries... Does it mean 
that there are no unethical practices in the developed countries? Does it also mean that 
those who are not certified in the developing countries are following unethical 
practices? Does it not imply such an inference? If so it is a clear case of defamation 
and the certifying agencies should be made to pay compensation to all other producers 
who are following the laws of the land and providing the required welfare measures to 
their workers.” 
 
In this way, the legitimacy of the authorship of the international standards was widely 
questioned, enabling resistance of specific demands placed on businesses, without the 
universal applicability of the overarching human rights norms being called into question. 
 
Lost in translation? 
 
Counter strategies able to be employed by representatives of standards bodies are also 
important to consider. Lack of specificity and interpersonal dynamics are important to 
understand here. Lack of specificity in the codes, discussed above, made counter-arguments 
by these representatives difficult to mount. In practice, it was often extremely challenging to 
specify the reasonable limits of business responsibility for institutional change. It was unclear 
under what conditions existing constraints should count as ‘indemnities’ from responsibility 
(on the grounds that ‘ought implies can’), or under what conditions businesses could instead 
reasonably be required to engage in processes of capacity building and institutional change.  
 
Interpersonal dynamics also were important. Resistance strategies deployed by business were 
strengthened by the anxiety of international standard setting representatives not to impose 
themselves ‘imperialistically’ in situations they didn’t fully understand. The ‘judo move’ 
described above was capable of invoking feelings of ‘postcolonial guilt’ in local standard 
setting bodies. For example, one staff member from Rainforest Alliance who we interviewed 
commented: 
 
“We want to be sensitive; we don’t want to throw our weight around in an area like 
this that we don’t really understand – we defer to the collective bargaining agreement 
on labour issues. There are vocal and strong trade unions here – we can’t start getting 
involved in things like negotiating wages – you could get bogged down in a quagmire 
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with all those kinds of things ... You can get mired in that stuff – we are just a small 
team here. We know our limits and want to stay focused on action”. 
 
In another case, core staff of one standard setting organisation explicitly rejected the notion 
that international standard setting bodies could operate as legitimate forums for settling sector 
wide issues such as wages and overtime. One FLO staff member argued:  
 
“There’s nothing I can do about it because it’s all something that government is 
involved in... there are unions that are involved in it, tea management is involved in it. 
It’s not just one tea management, one union and one estate. The entire tea sector is 
involved. In fact currently the wage decision is under dispute with the High Court – 
the tribunal award has been disputed by the tea management and the case is going in 
the High Court. …There is no role for anybody in fact, no role for anybody from fair 
trade I think, because the law of the land does take its own course.” 
 
Contestation and resistance surrounding the definition and interpretation of standards played 
an important role in shaping dynamics of code implementation, influencing what degree of 
compliance can realistically be expected to result from private regulatory standards. When 
considering whether the inclusion of contextual flexibilities strengthens or weakens private 
standards systems, it may well be important to consider not only formal provisions within 
code content, but also the informal dynamics through which interpretation and 
implementation is negotiated between businesses, standard setting organisations and other 
stakeholders. 
 
IV. Implications for the business responsibility to respect: refining the 
art of translation 
 
The UNSR’s responsibility to respect framework clearly recognises the value of human rights 
obligations of business being adapted to accommodate the varying social and institutional 
environments in which transnational businesses operate. Similar principles of contextual-
responsiveness are embodied within the multiple private regulatory codes that currently exist 
to regulate the human rights impacts of transnational business activity. However, in the 
absence of clear principles and procedures to regulate the translation of general principles 
into varying contexts, the context-specific human rights obligations of transnational business 
remain deeply ambiguous. The under-specification of business obligations provides an 
opening to allow some businesses to resist their human rights obligations at various stages of 
the regulatory process, in particular during processes of interpretation and implementation of 
codified regulatory standards. Further, resistance strategies are enhanced when the legitimacy 
of the codes’ authorship is widely questioned. 
 
As a result, there is a persistent risk that regulatory efficacy will be ‘lost in translation’, as 
contestation over the definition of specific business responsibilities is resolved in inconsistent 
and ad hoc ways. Yet the potential benefits of context-responsiveness in implementation 
means that it isn’t possible to simply read across codes and judge which are responding to 
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context in ways that strengthen regulatory effectiveness, and which operate to allow 
companies off the hook. 
 
What, then, does our analysis suggest for how the UNSR’s responsibility to respect principles 
might be operationalised in context-responsive ways that strengthen rather than weaken the 
regulatory purposes of the responsibility to respect framework? First, these regulatory 
systems require clearer substantive principles to regulate how relevant contextually-variant 
capacities, burdens and constraints are to be identified and weighed.39 Codes need to make 
more explicit which aspects of local context are to be taken into account in operationalising 
standards of progressive realisation.40 
 
Clearer procedures through which contestation about context specific interpretations of 
regulatory principles can be resolved in particular cases are also important, as highlighted by 
Melish and Meidinger’s chapter in this volume.Yet clear processes for resolving contestation 
around standard interpretation are absent from most existing regulatory schemes. There are 
examples of leadership on this issue. Some private regulatory initiatives have established 
quite extensive processes of producer consultation in particular locations, for example via 
formal regional bodies in the case of FLO, or via more ad hoc yet regular consultative forums 
in the case of Rainforest Alliance. These offer at least some means of informal deliberation 
through which negotiations around standards’ interpretation can occur.  
 
Such consultation can provide an important basis for pushing back against the ‘judo move’ 
we described above. Working from areas of agreement (specifically agreement on 
commitment to human rights) can help build common understanding of how to realise these 
rights. This in turn may help reduce resistance to the external imposition of international 
standards based on perceptions of these standards as new expressions of a colonial project. 
Building processes of setting and implementing private regulatory standards that enable 
greater influence for businesses, farmers and workers in producing countries could take the 
force out of at least some of these resistance strategies, and increase the capacity of private 
international standard setters to push back against such resistance. 
 
It is no coincidence that the kinds of issues we are highlighting here go to the heart of the 
most political aspects of the institutional arrangements through which regulatory standards 
are managed. The contestation and resistance documented above highlight the deeply 
                                                 
39We have elaborated elsewhere normative principles that could provide some basis for clarifying some of the 
ambiguities discussed above. See for example Macdonald, "Re-Thinking “Spheres of Responsibility”: Business, 
Human Rights and Institutional Action.". 
40 One possible short-cut to this end that has been used in some existing cases is to benchmark progressive 
realisation obligations against businesses identified as the best in a particular location or region. One 
informative example in this respect is the ILO’s WISE program, discussed in Fiona Haines, The Paradox of 
Regulation: What Regulation Can Achieve and What It Cannot  (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011)., pp. 164-
166. In other cases, wage rates and/or requirements regarding provision of social infrastructure have been 
audited with reference to local or regional standards. See for example discussion of the Starbucks Cafe Practices 
program in Kate Macdonald, "Globalising Justice within Coffee Supply Chains? Fair Trade, Starbucks and the 
Transformation of Supply Chain Governance," Third World Quarterly: Special Issue on ‘Beyond CSR? 
Business, Poverty and Social Justice’ 25, no. 7 (2007). 
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political character of these kinds of private regulatory standards, which press businesses to 
accept potentially burdensome responsibilities for supporting public regulatory goals. Not 
only can these responsibilities be costly in terms of resources and time, but they can require 
companies to go well beyond local norms (for example in paying living not minimum 
wages), and to give up significant forms of control, subjecting themselves in quite intrusive 
ways to interventions by affected stakeholders. It is not surprising then that businesses may 
seek to resist and limit such obligations where possible.  
 
Given this, our conclusions highlight not only what is missing from existing approaches, but 
also one of the most serious obstacles to promoting regulatory processes of this kind: that is, 
the need to confront deeply political problems of entrenched power relations, conflicting 
interests, and competing claims of legitimacy. One of the most politically appealing features 
of the responsibility to respect framework is almost certainly the modest character of the 
demands that it places on powerful businesses and governments. This follows as much from 
what is underspecified within the framework as the substance of what the framework 
clarifies. By advocating clearer business responsibilities for realising human rights, the 
framework at least affirms the values and purposes of those seeking deeper social 
transformation. But by leaving key details of such obligations underspecified, the 
framework’s formulation ensures that it does not pose any serious challenges to existing 
distributions of social power and resources.  
 
In this sense, the UNSR’s responsibility to respect framework is perhaps giving greater 
weight than is usually recognised to context of a rather different kind: the context of the 
prevailing political environment. The UNSR’s framework needs to survive in this 
international political environment if it is to have the opportunity go to work as a framework 
of transnational business regulation. While current ambiguities regarding the distribution of 
regulatory burdens may mean that much is lost in translation from the perspective of 
regulatory efficacy, such ambiguities may play an important role in enabling the regulatory 
standards to survive within an inhospitable political environment. This is a trade-off that both 
regulatory and human rights scholars would do well to take more seriously. 
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Appendix 1: Standards analysed in coding 
 
1. 4C Code of Conduct and related docs 
2. Business Social Compliance Initiative Code of Conduct 
3. Electronic Industry Code of Conduct 
4. Equator Principles 
5. Ethical Tea Partnership  
6. Ethical Trading Initiative 
7. Fairtrade Labelling Organisation - Generic Hired Labour, Generic Contract 
Production, Generic Small Producer, Generic Trade 
8. Fair Wear Foundation Code of Labor Practices 
9. FLA Workplace Code of Conduct 
10. Flower Label Program International Code of Conduct 
11. Forestry Stewardship Council Principles and Criteria 
12. Global Social Compliance Programme 
13. International Council on Mining and Metals Sustainability Framework 10 Principles 
14. ICTI CARE Process: International Toy Industry's Ethical Manufacturing Programme 
15. ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and 
Social Policy 
16. International Finance Corporation’s Performance Standards on Social and 
Environmental Sustainability 
17. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
18. Rainforest Alliance Sustainable Agriculture Standard, including Addendum and Local 
Interpretation Guidelines 
19. SA8000 
20. UTZ Certified 'Good Inside' Coffee, Coca, Tea Farms, Tea Factories 
21. Worker Rights Consortium / United Students Against Sweatshops 
22. World Fair Trade Organization 10 Principles of Fair Trade 
23. Worldwide Responsible Accredited Production (WRAP) 
24. Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Palm Oil 
25. Monash Castan Centre & International Business Leaders Forum‘Human Rights 
Translated’ 
26. IFC Performance Standards Guidelines 
27. FLA Guide to Best practice in hiring, termination, disciplinary procedures and 
resolving grievances 
28. Global Compact 
29. Flower Label Program Guidelines for the socially and environmentally responsible 
production of cut flowers, ferns, plants and foliage 
30. SA8000 Guidelines 
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31. Principles for Global Corporate Responsibility: Bench Marks for Measuring Business 
Performance 
32. International Confederation of Free Trade Unions Code of Labour Practice  
33. Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights 
 
ISO 26000 was still in draft form at the time of writing, and though investigated, was not 
included in the full coding. 
 
 
